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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: APPLYING THE
DOCTRINES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO EFFECTUATE STUDENT-ATHLETE
INTENT UNDER THE NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT
"I don't feel like I should play for somebody who has never seen
me play."1
"The players have no voice, and that's wrong .... [Ihf a coach
leaves before the player sets foot on campus, the player should have
the ability to choose [a school] again."2
Under the current rules governing an incoming student-athlete's
relationship with the chosen university, however, the player does
not have such a choice. The dramatic turnover of intercollegiate
coaches in recent years3 has resulted in an increasing number of
incoming student-athletes who have signed a National Letter of
Intent (NLI)4 to play for and attend a particular institution being
"left behind" when the coach for whom they have chosen to play
departs for greener pastures. A coach is free to leave the university
to pursue alternate career paths, often bringing his or her style of
play to another university, yet the athletes recruited to play in that
1. Ezra Williams, top basketball signee of 1998-1999 for the University of Georgia,
commenting on his pending decision whether to leave Georgia because of the men's
basketball coaching change that occurred after he signed a National Letter of Intent to play
for Georgia, but before he matriculated at the school. Chip Towers, Bulldogs, Harrich May
Lose Signee, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Apr. 13,1999, at 3E. Williams later decided to remain at
Georgia.
2. Mike Krzyzewski, president of the National Association of Basketball Coaches and
head men's basketball coach at Duke University, commenting on the restrictive nature of the
National Letter of Intent. BillBrubaker, Departed Coaches, DesertedRecruits: CourtshipRife
with "Debatable Ethics," WASH. PosT, July 19, 1998, at Dl.
3. For example, forty-one Division I men's basketball programs began the 1998-1999
season with anew coach. 1d This Note is concernedwith the general problem facing student-
athletes in all intercollegiate athletic programs, not solely men's basketball. The turnover
of college men's basketball coaches, however, is especially high compared to other collegiate
sports, and the coverage afforded the issue in this Note is correspondingly great.
4. For the text of the National Letter of Intent [hereinafter 2000-2001 NLIJ, see infra
APP. A, at 2218-2224.
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coach's system are precluded from following the one for whom they
wished to play.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the
Collegiate Commissioner's Association (CCA), and proponents of
the NLI see no injustice in such a situation.5 They stridently assert
that the athlete agrees to toil in a program, devoting countless
hours to practice, and incurring obligations far greater than a
nonathlete student, not because of an affinity for a particular
coach's personality, style of play, or reputation for molding
professional athletes,6 but for the school itself.7 Such views hold
true in numerous situations, but are not shared by those left with
uncertain futures because of the coach's departure-the incoming
student-athlete.8 Enforcement of the NLI results in a situation in
which a coach can tear up his contract and move to an environment
in which he can immediately pursue his dreams, aspirations, and
occupation. The prospective student-athlete, however, is not so
fortunate.9
The current NLI enforcement policy has been severely criticized
by intercollegiate coaches. Dale Brown, the former head men's
basketball coach at Louisiana State University, once compared the
athlete's predicament to that of a bride arriving at the chapel and
5. The NCAA is the governing body of the intercollegiate athletic system. Its central
purpose is to "maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." NCAA,
1998-99 NCAA DVISION I MANUAL § 1.3.1, at 1 (1998) [hereinafter NCAAMANUAL]; see also
Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game Plan,
46 ALA. L. REv. 487 (1995). The NCAA, however, does not directly regulate the NLI Program
(NLIP). The NLIP is administered by the CCA, a body within the NCAA composed of the
commissioners of member conferences. The daily administration of the NLIP is through the
Southeastern Conference offices. NCAAFrequently-Asked Questions on The National Letter
oflntent /FinancialAid, at http'/www.ncaa.orgleligibility/faqslfaqs-nlifinancial-aid.html,
(last visited Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter NCAA, FAQs].
. 6. See Fortay v. University of Miami, No. 93-3443,1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1865 (D.N.J.
Feb. 17, 1994).
7. See, e.g., Mark Woods,Athletes ona One-WayRoadAfter Signing, PALMBEACHPOST,
June 10, 2000i at 1C (referring to a statement by C.M. Newton, former athletic director at
the University of Kentucky, that, "[ylou don't choose a coach, you choose a schoo).
8. Brubaker, supra note 2, at D1; Danny O'Neil, The Letter is the Law, SEATrLE TIMES,
July 28, 1999, at D8.
9. Woods, supra note 7, at 1C.
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discovering that the groom did not show.1" Rick Pitino, once
notorious for moving from one coaching position to the next, stated
that his "personal feeling is that the recruits should have the right
to go" and follow their coaches." Even Cedric Dempsey, president
of the NCAA, agreed that the welfare of the student-athletes should
be taken into account "because they're the ones who are caught in
the middle."'
2
Despite such sentiment, and the outcries of players who have
been jilted at Dale Brown's proverbial alter, players continue to be
bound to the universities with which they signed. The rules
governing the NLI
have not been discussed at any great length [by college sports
administrators] in recent years. But as we have become more
and more concerned about... student-athlete welfare this is one
of those issues where you ask Are the rules fair to the student-
athletes? This is certainly an issue that deserves some
discussion.5
Such a discussion, in the context of presenting two avenues
for student-athletes to free themselves of the NLI's transfer
constraints, is the focus of this Note. The current rules and
relationships between college administrators and student-athletes
harken to a time when coaches remained at institutions for their
entire careers (often becoming institutions in their own right), but
are no longer applicable in the current era of intercollegiate
athletics. The primary goal of this Note is to apply traditional
contract principles to the NLI to posit possible causes of action that
support the incoming student-athlete's position, and that would
afford such an athlete the option to reselect a school if the athlete's
anticipated coach has vacated the position.
The first part of the Note will introduce the reader to the NLI: its
history, provisions, and purposes." The second part will discuss the
10. Brown continued "I believe she can go home, can't she?... She doesn't have to marry
the minister or the best man, does she?" Woods, supra note 7, at C. Under current NCAA
regulations, "[yles, she does." Id.
11. Jack McCallum, Not First Class, Coach, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 3, 1987, at 86.
12. Brubaker, supra note 2, at D1.
13. Id. (quoting Cedric Dempsey).
14. See infra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
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contractual nature of the student-university relationship to lay the
groundwork for a discussion of the student-athlete's possible causes
of action. Courts' general unwillingness to rule in the student's
favor in actions brought against their respective universities and
the failed legal theories asserted in such suits will be explored as
well.'5 Finally, the third part will propose and analyze novel causes
of action that the student-athlete may be able to assert in a
successful action to terminate the NLI when a coach surrenders his
or her position. Specifically, the athlete may assert nonperformance
of conditions precedent to formation of a contract with the
university, and apply the doctrine of unconscionability to the NLI
itself.'
6
The scope of this Note is limited to possible causes of action for
attacking the restrictive nature of the NLI by incoming student-
athletes [hereinafter athletes]. The concerns of those already
matriculated and involved in the athletic program, though no less
significant, will not be addressed.
To place the Note in the proper context, an analogous situation
that nonsports fans are more likely to understand may be
appropriate. Not allowing the athlete the option to transfer when
a coach leaves is akin to eating at a restaurant and receiving the
wrong entree. If you order chicken and get beef, (were the CCA
and NCAA operating the establishment) you would be obligated to
eat it, even though it was not your choice. One of the advantages
of eating out is that we are allowed to order what we want,
constrained of course by restaurant type and menu selection, and
if we receive the wrong dish, we can send it back in exchange for
the desired entree. That same opportunity should be afforded to
athletes. 7
15. See infra notes 46-106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 107-83 and accompanying text.
17. The analogy was adopted from McCallum, supra note 11.
2184 [Vol. 43:2181
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
THE NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT
History
The National Letter of Intent Program (NLIP) is administered by
the CCA, with the basic purpose of providing certainty in the
recruiting process.18 Started in 1964 with seven conferences and
eight independent institutions, fifty leagues and over 500
institutions currently participate in the program.19
The NLIP was spawned by concerns for both the athlete and the
recruiting institutions. During the early years of college athletics,
recruiting efforts focused on the geographic region in which the
university was located. 0 Advances in technology and trans-
portation, however, quickly expanded the scope of recruiting efforts,
and with the return of World War H soldiers, university officials
began to see athletic programs as an untapped revenue source.21
Increased focus on revenue derived from "big time" athletic
programs resulted in a correspondingly increased emphasis on
recruiting. Few, if any, rules existed to regulate university
recruiters' conduct towards a potential athlete.22 The athlete heard
sales pitches detailing a program's storied past and bright future,
and coaches often engaged mothers in "sincere" conversations
regarding the athlete's education and general well-being.' Athletes
and their families were constantly under pressure to attend one
university or another, and the athlete's schedule was continually
disrupted.'
The fierce recruiting battles for "blue chip" athletes took its toll
on universities as well. Larger institutions often faired better
financially than smaller universities, but the impact on athletic
18. See CCA, NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT: GUIDELINES, at http'/www.national-
letter.org/guidelines (last visited Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter NLI GUIDELINES].
19. Id. The institutional commitment, by which a college or university enrolls in the
NLIP can be found infra APP. B, at 2225.
20. Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of
Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1287 (1989).
21. Id. at 1288.
22. Id. at 1287-89.
23. Id at 1289.
24. Id.
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department budgets was noticeable across the board.25 The
movement for a solution or an alternative to the then-prevalent
recruiting practices grew in strength as economic exigencies
reached prohibitive proportions.26
Bythe early 1960s, after fifteen years of conference-by-conference
experimentation with various letter-of-intent programs, momentum
gathered for a national letter of intent. Initial NCAA suggestions
for a compulsory system were met by vigorous dissent, led by
smaller universities who viewed a letter of intent as favoring larger,
more financially sound institutions.'
A voluntary program, adopted in 1964, called for a prospective
athlete, a parent or guardian, and the chosen institution's athletic
director, to sign an "Inter-Conference Letter of Intent" on a specific
date.29 The letter certified that the student intended to enroll at the
chosen institution and indicated, if applicable, any financial aid
that was to be provided to the student by the institution.0 From the
athlete's view, the primary reason for signing the NLI was that
once signed, no other participating institution could recruit the
athlete further.3 '
The Current NLI and Requirements
The NLI is "a contract of sorts, a written agreement.... The most
important service the program does is cease the recruiting process
when the kid signs." 32 The NLI is a binding agreement between a
prospective athlete and an institution in which the athlete agrees
to attend the institution for one full academic year in exchange
for athletic financial aid for that year.3 The athlete must be
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. NLI GUIDELINES, supra note 18.
28. Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: AnApplication of Contract Theory, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 96, 118 n.125 (1985).
29. Id.
30. NLI GUIDELINES, supra note 18.
31. Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1293.
32. O'Neil, supra note 8, at D8 (quoting Karl Hicks, Associate Commissioner of the
Southeastern Conference). The Southeastern Conference is responsible for administrative
tasks related to the NLIP.
33. NCAA, FAQs, supra note 5.
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academically eligible to attend the chosen institution and the NLI
must be accompanied by an institutional financial aid agreement. 4
The NLI does not guarantee the athlete a place on the sports team,
nor does it guarantee playing time. Further, the NLI is not satisfied
if the athlete completes one season of athletic competition-he or
she must attend the institution for one academic year.35
Even though the NLI is a written one-year agreement, the athlete
need not sign a new NLI each year while in attendance at the
chosen institution. At the end of the academic year covered by the
agreement, the coach and athletic director will advise the financial
aid department whether to renew the athletic aid.3 6 Renewal is
discretionary on the part of the athletic department, as neither the
institution nor the athlete carries any obligations under the NLI
after completion of the first academic year. 7
Penalties will be imposed on the athlete by the CCA should the
athlete fail to attend the institution for one year. 8 The basic
penalty for failure to satisfy the terms of the NLI is a two-year
suspension from competition at the athlete's new institution.
Specifically, the athlete "may not represent the latter institution
in intercollegiate athletics competition until [the athlete has]
completed two full academic years of residence at the latter
institution. Further, [the athlete] understand[s] that [he or she]
shall be charged with the loss of two seasons of intercollegiate
athletics competition in all sports."39 This two-year penalty may be
reduced to one-year if the institution releases the athlete from
the NLI obligations through execution of a Qualified Release
Agreement (QRA).40 The QRA must be signed by the athlete, a
parent or guardian, and the Athletic Director (AD) of the releasing
34. 2000-2001NLI, infra APP. A, 2 ("The [financial aid] award letter shall list the terms
and conditions of the award, including the amount and duration of the financial aid. If such
conditions are not met, [the] NLI shall be declared null and void.").
35. Id- 3.
36. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
37. Id.
38. If the athlete transfers to an institution that does not participate in the NLIP,
penalties cannot be assessed because participation is a voluntary decision of the institution.
The athlete will be penalized if he or she ever transfers to a participating institution. NCAA,
FAQs, supra note 5.
39. 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 4.
40. For the text of the current QRA, see infra APP. C, at 2225-2226.
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institution.41 Notably, only the AD may grant the athlete's release;
the athlete's potential coach is not vested with authority under NLI
guidelines to grant the necessary permission.42
An appeals process is available to athletes under "extenuating
circumstances. "4 The one-year suspension may be appealed to
the NLI Appeals Committee, "whose decision shall be final and
binding."4 Such appeals are rarely granted, however, and grants
are extremely unlikely when the athlete appeals to obtain a full
release from the NLI because of a coaching change.45 The end result
is that, in virtually all circumstances, the athlete will be penalized
for attending an institution different than that indicated in the
NLI.
CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY
RELATIONSHIP
Survey of Case Law
The principal function of contract law has been viewed as
providing a framework for the enforcement of promises.48 A contract
is itself a promise or set of promises that creates legal obligations
and duties.' For a contract to exist, there must be a bargained-
for exchange, the finding of which depends on the presence of
41. 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 5. Whether an athlete is released from the NLI is a
discretionary decision made by the institution's AD. The general trend is for institutions to
enforce the NLI and refuse to release the athlete. Fortayv. Universityof Miami, No. 93-3443,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1865, at *14 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 1994) (not releasing athlete from NLI
when head coach left the institution); Erech Cotton, Williams Eager to Start Over,
CHARLESTONDAILY MAIL, Aug. 13, 1996, at 1B (same); Mike Hutton, Please Release Me, Let
Me Go: Intent Letter Binds Recruit to Purdue, CHIC. TRIB., April 21, 1996, at C6 (same). The
NCAA supports the inflexible nature of these decisions. When asked under what
circumstances would the NCAA support an athlete's request for a QRA, Jane Jankowski,
NCAA Public Information Coordinator replied, "If a university completely drops a program,
that is a possibility." Woods, supra note 7, at 1C.
42. See 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 5.
43. Id. 6.
44. Id.
45. Id. 4.
46. See Timothy Davis, Balancing Freedom of Contract and Competing Values in Sports,
38 S. Tax. L. REv. 1115, 1118 (1997).
47. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
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consideration." A contract may be enforceable without consid-
eration if equitable principals so mandate. 9
Courts recognize that the student-university relationship is
contractual in nature. The catalogues, bulletins, regulations, and
scholarships that the university offers to the student become part
of the contract.5" In Zunbrum v. University of Southern California,
for example, the plaintiff alleged that the university had breached
its contractual obligation to teach a sociology course with a certain
number of lectures and a final examination.5" The plaintiff asserted
that the tuition and fees paid for the course served as adequate
consideration.52 The court held that a slight departure from a
projected course of study does not necessarily entitle a student to
damages for breach of contract, and that it is the province of the
trier of fact to resolve questions about the reasonableness of student
expectations and the nature of the departure.53 The rule that
emerges, therefore, is that just because a university is a defendant
the fundamental contractual nature of the parties relationship is
not altered and students may make use of factfinders to determine
the scope of that relationship.
Specific solicitations, whether written or oral, from an academic
institution to a potential student can also serve as the basis for
a student's breach of contract action against the institution.'
In Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting, Academy officials
solicited the plaintiffs to induce them to enroll in the school's
paralegal program.5 During the course of the solicitation, officials
"represented that successful completion of its paralegal curriculum
48. Id. § 17; Harold B. Hilborn,Student-AthletesandJudicialInconsistency: Establishing
a Duty to Educate as a Means ofFostering MeaningfulReform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 741,747 (1995). See generally JOHN D. CALAWARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS ch. 4 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the consideration requirement); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2 (2d ed. 1998) (same).
49. RESTATFIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 86, 90 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Ct. App. 1972).
See generally Gil Fried & Michael Hiller, ADR in Youth and Intercollegiate Athletics, 1997
BYU L. REV. 631, 642-48 (discussing NLIs, scholarship agreements and student codes of
conduct as documents that create contractual relationships between schools and students).
51. Zumbrun, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting, 582 N.E.2d 54, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
55. Id. at 56.
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would yield an associate's degree in paralegal studies, that the
school had job placement services," and that starting salaries for
Academy graduates were "guaranteed at or around $20,000 to
$25,000 per year." " After enrolling, the students discovered that
these representations were all false, and instituted a suit against
the Academy for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and fraud.57
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's
dismissal of the case, holding that material promises made through
incessant solicitations, regardless of form, are guarantees that must
be upheld.58
Promises made to athletes also serve as a basis for asserting a
breach of contract claim against a university. Where a university
makes identifiable contractual promises to an athlete, a breach
action may lie if the school does not make a good faith effort to
perform its promises.59 In Ross v. Creighton, a men's basketball
player sued Creighton University, alleging that promises regarding
academic benefits that would be provided by the school if Ross were
to attend were never tendered.0 The court held that a contractual
56. Id. Officials also represented that the Academy had certain admission standards, a
financial aid program, library facilities, Westlaw and Lexis training, and that hours
accumulated at the Academy were transferable to Ohio State University. Id-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 59.
59. See Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410,417 (7th Cir. 1992). A thorough analysis of Ross
can be found in Hilborn, supra note 48, at 758. Hilborn also argues for judicial recognition
of a special relationship that may exist between athletes and universities based on the
potentially exploitative nature of such relationships. Id. at 765-72. In the context of failure
to educate, Hilborn posits that institutions should be held accountable for educating their
athletes under an implied-promise rationale. Id. The relationship is established during the
recruiting process and solidified as the athlete is utilized as a money-making tool of the
university. The athlete's role as a "money-maker" distinguishes his or her relationship with
the university from that of a "normal" student. Hilborn concludes that the reality of the
relationship between athletes and universities "provides more of a compelling moral
justification for imposing an implied dutyto educate than do express, identifiable contractual
promises." Id. at 770.
The athlete's role as an instrument of financial gain is further explored in James V. Koch,
The Economics of"Big Tirne"IntercollegiateAthletics, 52 Soc. ScI. Q.248 (1971). Koch views
intercollegiate athletics as an industry. The NCAA is described as a cartel, its member
institutions are compared to business firms, and the athletes are labeled "inputs." Id. at 248-
51.
60. Ross, 957 F.2d at 412. Specifically, Creighton assured Ross that he would receive
sufficient tutoring to enable him to "receive a meaningful education while at CREIGHTON."
Id at 411.
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relationship exists between a university and its athletes, but to
state such a claim, the athlete "must point to an identifiable
contractual promise that the defendant failed to honor."61 Such a
narrow holding, though recognizing the contractual relationship,
seemingly forces students to bargain for specific contractual terms,
and virtually eliminates a student's ability to assert a breach claim
based on failure to perform implied promises.
Recognition of a student's contractual relationship with an
institution has not always worked in the athlete's favor. An athlete
who refused to participate in athletic competition because he felt
his academic performance would suffer was held in breach of
contractual duties owed to a university in Taylor v. Wake Forest
University.62 Taylor, a football player at Wake Forest, sought
recovery of educational expenses after the university terminated his
athletic scholarship.63 Taylor claimed that the Wake Forest football
coaches breached an oral promise to limit his involvement in the
athletic program if such involvement led to educational conflicts."
Taylor refused to participate in the football program after his
freshman year, citing poor academic performance as the reason
for his absence. The university then terminated his athletic
scholarship. The court held that by failing to participate, Taylor
breached his duty to perform contractual obligations undertaken
when he accepted a Football Grant-in-Aid that was "'awarded for
academic and athletic achievement."6 5
The applicable case law, therefore, points to the conclusion that
an athlete may assert a breach of contract action against an
institution because the requisite contractual relationship exists
between the parties.
61. Id. at 417.
62. 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting grant language). The scholarship application filed by Taylor provided,
"I agree to maintain eligibility for intercollegiate athletics under both Conference and
Institution rules. Training rules for intercollegiate athletics are considered rules of the
Institution, and I agree to abide by them." Id. One of Wake Forestfs Grant-in-Aid policy
provisions stated that financial aid could be terminated for "[r]efusal to attend practice
sessions or scheduled work-out[s] that are a part of the athletic program or to act in such a
manner as to disrupt these sessions." Id. at 380.
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NLI as a Contract
The structural keystone of the market for student-athlete inputs
is the national letter of intent. Once a prospective student-
athlete who otherwise qualifies for financial aid signs a letter of
intent with a given university [ he is bound to that university
[ for the space of one year and he may not sign with, nor be
signed by, any other university [. ... The national letter of
intent is properly seen as a [ contract which, if not fulfilled by
either party to the contract, results in substantial penalties
being levied by the NCAA.'
A National Letter of Intent, Not a Letter of Intent
The first issue to address when analyzing the NLI as a contract
is the title of the agreement itself-Letter of Intent. Ordinarily, and
especially in the business world, a Letter of Intent is merely a
handshake substitute that temporarily memorializes agreed upon
details within a negotiation." The Letter provides a type of ongoing
performance ledger, detailing what will be the obligations of each
party upon reaching a final agreement,68 but drafted "without
anticipation of legal consequences."" A letter of intent used during
negotiations for a corporate merger or acquisition, for example,
"indicates the nature of the contemplated transaction and sum-
marizes its basic terms,"v0 but will also include statements that a
"formal" agreement is contemplated.7 A "true" letter of intent,
therefore, is tentative and lacks any of the commitment that
characterizes a binding agreement. Some posit that in the business
community, the words "letter of intent" tend to negate implications
of a binding agreement."v
66. Koch, supra note 59, at 253.
67. Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1302.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 288 (1987).
71. See generally id. at 287-94 (describing typical preliminary agreements).
72. Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1303. Cozzillio quotes the testimony of a commercial-law
attorney as an illustration:
A letter of intent is basically the way I would express it an agreement to agree
[sic]. It is a letter that generally represents-another synonymous word for it
2192 [Vol. 43:2181
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The NLI is manifestly dissimilar to lettets of intent prevalent
within the business community. The crucial distinction between the
two is that the NLI is not a precursor to a more formal commitment,
whereas the typical business letter of intent "anticipates a future
memorialization."3 Further, the NLI contains all material terms
and "there is no need for judicial 'gap filling.""7 The NLI itself
reflects the athlete's commitment to an institution in exchange for
the institution's financial aid and educational commitments.
Contract Underpinnings of the NLI
At base level, contract formation involves an offer, acceptance of
the offer, and an exchange of consideration or a consideration
substitute." The written scholarship offer made by an institution
as a precursor to an athlete signing the NLI constitutes an offer to
enter a bilateral contract.76 Scholarship letters manifest the
institution's willingness to provide financial aid to the athlete in
return for the athlete's promise of attendance. The proposal is
addressed to the potential recipient of the scholarship and includes
all of the material terms of the aid package.77
is a memorandum of understanding. It means, "We will sit down and actively
and seriously try to come to a firm understanding .... " I think the words
"agreement to agree" or "the commencement of formalization of serious
negotiations" is the best way I can express it.
Id. at 1303 n.113 (citing Itok Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., 274 A.2d 141, 143 (Del. 1971)).
73. Id. at 1305.
74. Id- at 1306; Farnsworth, supra note 70.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise or set of
promises for the breach ofwhich the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty."). See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 48, §§
2.1 to 2.26 (discussing intent to contract, offer, mutual assent, and acceptance elements of
a valid contract).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) ("An offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding
that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."); Cozzillio, supra note 20, at
1311-16 (discussing the scholarship as an offer).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 (1981) (discussing the weight of to
whom the offer is addressed). One could argue that the financial aid offer is not an "offer" in
a contractual sense, and that the NLI is the offer. This argument, however, is undercut by
the requirement that the athlete receive a written offer of financial aid before signing the
NLI, and the binding nature of the NLI itself. 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 1 2. The NLI
does not contain language to indicate that the athlete's commitment is a revocable offer until
receipt of scholarship approval. Id.
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The NLI, therefore, is written evidence of a binding, executory
pact between the institution and athlete.78 It is a promissory ac-
ceptance to the scholarship offer-the athlete promises to attend
the university in exchange for the promise of financial aid.
An argument can be made that the financial aid letter is an offer
to enter into a unilateral contract; however there is little evidence
that the university bargains for the athlete's performance without
any prior commitment, nor is there evidence that the scholarship
pledge can be abbreviated at will.7" The most persuasive argument
therefore, is that the NLI manifests the athlete's acceptance of the
institution's offer to enter into a bilateral contract.8 0
Courts will not enforce such an agreement without the presence
of consideration. TheRestatement of Contracts defines consideration
as "a performance or return promise [that] must be bargained for.
... A performance or returned promise is bargained for if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given
by the promisee in exchange for that promise.""1 Under the
Restatement's language, the institution's promise of financial aid
and the athlete's promise to attend the institution are the
consideration to support the contract. The institution offers aid for
the purpose of attracting the athlete, and in exchange for the
promise of aid, the athlete tenders his promise to matriculate.82
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (1981) ("Acceptance of an offer is a
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or
required by the offer.").
79. Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1318. An examination of the real-world application of
NLIs in the recruiting process undercuts the argument that the NLI is merely a form of
notice suggesting future performance, rather than the consummation of a bilateral contract.
When an athlete signs a NLI, the chosen institution has filled a scholarship, thereby
reducing the number of athletic aid packages left to offer to other recruits. Were the
institution merely seeking performance (arriving on campus and participating in athletics
once the academic year has begun), and not a promise to perform, the institution would not
be able to determine the number of scholarships available to offer to subsequent recruits with
any certainty. The athlete's promise to perform affords the institution this certainty, and
prevents the institution from overextending scholarship offers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 54,56 (1981).
80. Hutton, supra note 41, at C6 ("If a recruit doesn't sign a letter-of-intent, coaches will
use the scholarship for another player who will sign. The bottom line is that coaches want
guaranteed commitments.").
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71(1), 71(2) (1981).
82. Professors Calamari and Perillo offer an alternative definition of consideration,
derived in large part from Cardozo's 1927 opinion in Allegheny College v. National
Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). The professors propose a three-part test
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Court Treatment of the NLI
Stepping out of the theoretical discussion and back into reality,
courts have held that the NLI is a contract. Such recognition
allowed an athlete to assert a claim for breach of contract against
the University of Virginia for failure to provide adequate medical
treatment to the athlete's broken wrist.8 3 The court in Barile v.
University of Virginia held that Barile's signing of a NLI
established a contractual relationship between the school and he."
After signing the NLI, the University promised Barile that any
injury he received while engaged in athletic competition on behalf
of the University would be treated properly.85 Barile subsequently
broke his wrist while playing football for the school, but the
University did not treat the injury until two years had passed.86 The
court recognized that contract doctrine was "particularly applicable
to college athletes who contract by financial aid or scholarship
to determine whether consideration is present:
(a) The promisee must suffer legal detriment; that is, do or promise to do what
[the promisee] was not legally obligated to do; or refrain from doing or promise
to refrain from doing what [the promisee] is legally privileged to do.
(b) The detriment must induce the promise. In other words, the promisor must
have made [the promise] because the promisor wishes to exchange it at least in
part for the detriment to be suffered by the promisee.
(c) The promise must induce the detriment.... [Tihe promisee mustknow of the
offer and intend to accept.
CALAARI & PERILLO, supra note 48, § 4.2.
This formulation also supports the characterization of the NLI as a contract between an
athlete and an institution. The institution (promisee) suffers legal detriment by both offering
financial aid to the athlete, which it is not under a legal obligation to do, and by awarding
financial aid to an athlete, because such an award reduces the number of scholarship awards
available with which to recruit other athletes. The institution's detriment induces the
promise by an athlete (promisor) to matriculate in exchange for the institution's promise of
financial aid and an education. The third element of the test is satisfied because the
institution (promisee) knows of the athlete's promise to attend the school. When the Athletic
Director signs the NLI on behalf of the institution, he expressly responds to the promise.
Viewing the athlete as the promisee, the same analysis applies, as the relationship embodies
a bilateral contract, but brevity dictates such analysis be foregone.
83. See Barile v. University of Va., 441 N.E.2d 608, 616 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
84. Id. at 615. Cf Begleyv.MercerUniv., 367F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor
v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
85. Barile, 441 N.E.2d at 612.
86. The University of Virginia medical staff did tape Barile's wrist immediately after he
sustained the injury, but failed to provide the necessary surgical treatment until two years
after the injury occurred. Id
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agreement to attend college and participate in intercollegiate
athletics.8 7
Judicial recognition of the contractual nature of the athlete-
institution relationship has spawned numerous actions by
athletes who allege that their chosen university has in some way
breached a contractual promise.88 Courts, however, have been
reluctant to find for the plaintiff athletes.89 The following discussion
will highlight the unsuccessful approaches that athletes have used
to attack the institutions' seemingly impenetrable contractual
protection.
Athlete Attempts to Challenge the NLI
The enforceability of the NLI has long been a contentious point
for athletes seemingly trapped in programs that are no longer
desirable. There are no reported cases, however, where players have
challenged paragraph 19 of the NLI in court.90 This is directly
attributable to athletes' compliance with the appeals provisions of
the agreement.9 Scared away from the judicial system by courts'
reluctance to hold against university interests, the players languish
in an appeals system directed by university administrators. Such
a commingling of interests certainly invites further inquiry into the
fairness of the current system, especially when athletes are almost
invariably denied full releases from NLIs when coaches leave the
program." A brief survey of the case law determining the nature of,
and duties that arise from, the athlete-university relationship will
illustrate why athletes do not regularly challenge the enforceability
of the NLI in court.
Interpreting the contractual relationship between athletes and
institutions strictly, courts have recognized only the express
87. Id. at 615.
88. See infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. Paragraph 19 states, "If Coach Leaves. I understand that I have signed this NLI with
the institution and not for a particular sport or individual. For example, if the coach leaves
the institution or the sports program, I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI." 2000-
2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 19.
91. Id. 6.
92. Such an inquiry, though interesting and worthwhile in considering the overall
fairness of the NLI to athletes, is beyond the scope of this Note.
[Vol. 43:21812196
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
obligations set forth in the contract documents.93 Athletes have
urged courts to imply obligations, but such efforts have met stiff
resistance. One athlete asserted that his express contract with the
university implied rights to educational opportunity and to athletic
participation (as opposed to merely holding a spot on the roster).94
The Jackson v. Drake University court rejected this claim,
reasoning that "where the language of the contract is clear and
unambiguous, the language controls."95 The financial aid and
athletic documents did not expressly guarantee the athlete would
play basketball, thus the action failed.
Four years earlier, a similar result befell Washburn University
football players, who asserted an action for breach of contract,
alleging an implied right to play football.9" In Hysaw v. Washburn
University, the African-American athletes complained that the
coaching staff had subjected them to racial discrimination and that
when the school removed the players after they boycotted practices
and team meetings, the school had breached its contract with the
athletes.9 The university ultimately refused to allow the players to
rejoin the team.98 In addressing the athletes' claim, the court stated
that
when a written contract exists and its language is clear and
unambiguous, the language controls. Plaintiffs argue that they
were promised that they would be allowed to play football ....
Yet the written scholarship contracts they signed make no
indication of such promises. In fact, the only promises in those
written contracts were that the players would receive money."
In an unreported yet instructive opinion, a Connecticut court
denied a request by the members of the Yale University wrestling
93. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. See generally Davis, supra note 46
(discussing the influence of the bargain theory of contract on judicial decisions involving
intercollegiate athletes); Timothy Davis, College Athletics: TestingtheBoundaries ofContract
and Tort, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (1996).
94. Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
95. Id. at 1493 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992)).
96. Hysaw v. Washburn Univ., 690 F. Supp. 940,947 (D. Kan. 1987).
97. IM. at 942.
98. Id. at 943.
99. Id. at 946-47 (citations omitted).
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team to enjoin the university from terminating the varsity
wrestling program.'00 The athletes in Soderbloom v. Yale University
claimed that terminating the program constituted a breach of
contract for educational services that was entered into by the
athletes and the university.'0 ' The athletes alleged that written and
oral communications of the wrestling coach and various university
publications formed the basis of the breached contract.0 2 Two of the
wrestlers testified that they would not have attended Yale but for
the availability of the wrestling program.0" The court disregarded
such arguments, recognizing that the basic legal relationship in
question was contractual in nature. The court held that the athletes
would need to show a specific contract provision supporting their
claims for them to prevail.0 4
The opinion that has inspired perhaps the most commentary on
the contractual relationship between athletes and universities held
that the NLI, the scholarship agreement, and various recruiting
letters, but not the oral communications, constituted the contract
between the athlete and university. 5 The court in Fortay v.
University of Miami rejected the plaintiff's claims that oral
representations of University of Miami athletic officials and the
express contract between himself and the University of Miami
induced his matriculation at the institution and thereby gave rise
to implied contractual obligations. The court stated that "the
written contract is devoid of any express or even implied provision
that Fortay would be the starting quarterback."0 6
100. Soderbloom v. Yale Univ., No. CV-91-0324553 S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 256, at
*4 (1992).
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *7.
105. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Fortay v. University of Miami, No. 93-3443, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1865 (D.N.J. Feb. 17,
1994). For a thorough discussion the accountability of university officials for representations
made in the recruiting process see James Kennedy Ornstein, Comment, Broken Promises
and Broken Dreams: Should We Hold College Athletic Programs Accountable for Breaching
Representations Made inRecruitingStudent-Athletes?, 6 STONHALLJ. SPORTS L. 641 (1996).
Ornstein concludes that "big-time college recruiters should not be permitted to make open-
ended promises for the mere sake ofenticinghigh school athletes to attend their schools. The
legal basis exists to reprimand schools who engage in these activities." Id. at 668.
106. Fortay, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1865, at *2. Fortay is especially instructive because
of the specific allegations and factual circumstances involved in the case. Many considered
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Such holdings highlight courts' unwillingness to find for athletes
who claim to have been induced to attend a particular institution by
the representations of such institution's athletic officials. Thus, for
athletes to prevail in such actions against institutions, alternative
causes of action must be explored.
ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF AcTION IN SUPPORT OF THE ATHLETE'S
CLAIM
Strictly interpreting contracts between universities and athletes,
courts have refused to recognize implied obligations that may arise
from the contracts or parol representations made to the athlete, and
further, "have been disinclined to engage in the type of critical and
in-depth evaluation which is warranted in determining the extent
to which the range of theories available to student-athletes should
be expanded."10 7 Such holdings fail to recognize that the documents
that form the contract, and especially the NLI, are not bargained-
for exchanges, but standard form agreements. The athlete has
little room to bargain or transform representations made in the
recruiting process into express obligations through inclusion in the
contract documents. Athletes must then turn to alternative causes
of action to vindicate their rights vis-d-vis the chosen universities.
When oral or collateral representations form the basis for the claim
the doctrines of condition precedent and unconscionability are aptly
suited for this purpose.
Fortay one of the top high school quarterbacks in the nation, and he was a consensus high
school All-Americanduring his senior year at East Brunswick High School in New Jersey.
He was heavily recruited and decided to attend the University of Miami, known at the time
as "Quarterback U" because of the football program's success at developing first round draft
picks out of its previous quarterbacks. Fortay signed a NLI, committing to attend Miami
based on assurances byhead coach JimmyJohnson that Johnson was planning to remain the
Miami football coach for years to come, and other promises of playing time and development
into a first round draft choice. Soon after Fortay signed the NLI, Johnson left Miami to
accept a head coaching position with the Dallas Cowboys of the National Football League.
Fortay requested a release from the NLI, but Dennis Erickson, the coach hired to replace
Johnson, and other Miami athletic officials refused to release Fortay.
Fortay never assumed a starting quarterback role at Miami. Gino Torretta was named
the starting quarterback for the 1991 season, despite statements allegedly made by Erickson
assuring Fortay and his father of Fortay's playing time. Soon thereafter, Fortay transferred
from Miami to Rutgers University. See id. at *2-*3; Davis, College Athletics, supra note 93,
at 974-80.
107. Davis, College Athletics, supra note 93, at 1017.
20021 2199
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Condition Precedent
The Doctrine
Courts' reluctance to enforce implied promises in athletes'
contracts with universities significantly restricts the situations in
which a claim for breach can be established. By recharacterizingthe
oral representations made to athletes during the recruiting process
as conditions, however, the athlete may be able to achieve his or her
ultimate goal-a full release from the NLI. If a coach's statement
that he or she will remain part of the athletic program is held as a
condition, or condition precedent, only the fulfillment of such a
representation will trigger the athlete's duty to attend the
institution.' 8 Otherwise, the athlete's dutyto perform is discharged
and he or she may terminate the contract.' 9
A condition is "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur,
unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a
contract becomes due.""0 A condition, therefore, qualifies a duty
owed under a contract and imputes some degree of uncertainty as
to the occurrence of the event. The event may be made a condition
by agreement of the parties or by a term supplied by the court."' In
108. TheRestatement (First) ofContracts section 250 used the term"conditionprecedent"
to describe the conditions at issue in this Note. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 250
(1932). Section 224 of the Restatement (Second) eliminates this language and refers to
conditions precedent as "conditions." RESTATEENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 224, reporter's
note (1981). This Note will utilize the latter Restatement's terminology and refer to such
events as "conditions."
109. "'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement
or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 'termination' all
obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged .... " U.C.C. § 2-106(3)
(1998).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). A condition has been described
as the sine qua non of a contract's fulfillment. Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 706 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1983). For the purposes of this discussion, the institution is
the "obligee" and the athlete the "obligor."
111. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 226 (1981). This Note is concernedprimarily
with events made conditions by agreement of the parties. The reluctance of courts to imply
promises arising out of the athlete-university contract likely would carry over to a refusal
to imply conditions that would discharge the athlete's duty of performance. The oral
representations made to the athlete by a coach are express, as opposed to implied-in-law,
conditions. Id. § 226 cmt. (c). The distinction between the two is that an express condition
requires strict compliance, while implied-in-law conditions require only "substantial
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exercising freedom of contract, the parties may make even the most
trivial of events conditions to performance under the contract; there
is no test of reasonableness or materiality."
"Performance of a duty subject to a condition [is not] due unless
the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.""3 The obligor
need not tender performance until the event on which the obligor's
duty is conditioned occurs." Unless the condition has been
excused, the nonoccurrence of the condition discharges the obligor's
duty when the condition can no longer occur, however, such non-
occurrence is not a breach.'1 5
Promises and Conditions Distinguished
A promise, in contrast, creates a duty that must be fulfilled to
avoid a breach. A promise is generally defined as a "manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made
as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made." 6 The distinction between labeling a representation as
a condition or a promise dramatically affects the rights and duties
performance" to give rise to the obligor's duty to perform. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 48, § 11-8. In the present context, such a distinction, except for judicial recognition as
discussed above, likely would have no effect on the athlete's duty to attend the institution.
It is difficult to fathom a situation in which a coach "substantially complies" with the
condition that he or she remain at the chosen institution as the sport's team's head coach
without actually doing so. Strict compliance with such a condition is the only way in which
the representation could be fulfilled.
Similarly, the failure of an institution to fulfill its condition (that the coach remain at the
helm of the spores team), by its nature, dismisses any discussion of the university's right to
cure. The nonoccurrence of the condition temporarily suspends the obligor's dutyto perform.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981). Performance still may become due
if the obligee tenders performance within the agreed-upon period. Only after the time for
performance has lapsed and performance cannot be accomplished are the obligor's
subsequent duties discharged. Id. § 225(2). If the coach vacates his or her position, the only
way in which the university could fulfill the condition is by re-hiring the coach. Such action
is unlikely, and therefore, in effect, the athlete's duty is discharged once the coach resigns
the position.
112. FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 8.2.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981).
114. FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 8.2.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 225(2), 225(3) (1981); see also Jungmann
& Co., Inc. v. AtterburyBros., 163 N.E. 123 (N.Y. 1928) (holdingthata party maynot recover
on a contract without proof that it has performed all conditions to the contract).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
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of the parties under the NLI."' Failure of a condition will discharge
the athlete's duty to perform under the NLI (i.e., attend the
institution). If the representation is construed as a promise, the
athlete still may be held to performance under the contract, but can
bring suit to recover damages for breach.
Courts, when faced with ambiguous contracts, prefer to interpret
the questioned manifestations as promises, giving rise to a breach
action, rather than conditions, because nonoccurrence of a condition
results in forfeiture.118 Forfeiture is risked when the nature of the
condition is such that whether the event will occur is resolved only
after the parties have relied on the occurrence of the event in
preparing to perform their respective obligations.119
This interpretive preference seemingly works against the
athlete's interests. The representation by a coach that he or she will
remain the coach of the team while the athlete attends the
institution does involve a risk of forfeiture if not complied with,12
and under such an interpretive approach, is more likely to be
considered a promise giving rise to a possible action for breach.1"
It is important to note, however, that the contract and conditions
in question arise between the athlete and the university, not the
athlete and the coach. This distinction alters the preferential
treatment afforded to promises by the courts. 2 The preference for
117. See Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1359-67.
118. Forfeiture refers to the denial of compensation to the obligee that results from losing
its right to the agreed exchange under the contract after the obligee has relied substantially
on the expectation of that exchange. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONT ACSrs § 227 cmt. (b)
(1981). This interpretive preference entails a "full inquiry into the 'intention of the parties
and the good sense of the case' including such factors as whether the protected party can
achieve its principal goal without literal performance ... ." Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Natl
Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §227 cmt. (b) (1981).
120. The forfeiture would be both the institution's loss ofthe playerbecause the coach left,
and the institution's inability to have offered the held scholarship to another recruit.
121. But see supra notes 83-106 and accompanying text (discussing courts reluctance to
imply promises in the context of the athlete-university relationship).
122. See RESTATEMET (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. (b) (1981). The impracticality
of compensation in damages also favors the conclusion that the representation is a condition.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 8.4. It would be virtually impossible for a court to
determine a damage award in favor of the athlete. The court would be asked to determine
the monetary value to the athlete of the coach's presence at the university. Courts decline
to undertake such speculation. See Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 1W App. 542
(1932); see also, CALAMARI & PERILL, supra note 48, § 14.8.
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interpreting terms as promises applies only when the event is
within the obligee's control.1" The preferential rule does not apply
when performance is within a third party's control. m4 Whether the
coach remains at the institution is, to an extent, within the
university's control (the coach may be fired), but such control is
primarily within the province of the coach. The coach may leave the
position unilaterally to retire or accept a position at another
university.1" The university has no control over such decisions.
The preferential rule, therefore, should not be applied to a
representation that the coach will remain at the university. Instead,
the representation may be treated as a condition to the contract,
which if unfulfilled discharges the athlete's duty to perform,
thereby allowing the athlete to terminate the NLI.m6
Effect of the Parol Evidence Rule
The Rule and Application
As the condition argued by the athlete would be based upon
an oral representation, not recorded in any of the contractual
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 227 cmts. (b), (d) (1981).
124. Id.
125. Forexample, fifty-twoDivision Imen's basketball teams began the 2000-2001, season
with a new coach. NCAA Division I coaching changes (Sept. 14, 2000), at
http'//espn.go.comncWs/2000/02221373491.html. Of those fifty-two coaches, many departed
to accept coaching positions with other college programs or with National Basketball
Association (NBA) teams. Representative of this group are Leonard Hamilton, who left five
"blue chip" recruits committed to the University of Miami to accept the head coaching
position with the NBA's Washington Wizards, and Lon Kruger, who left the University of
Illinois for the NBA's Atlanta Hawks. Illinois was Kruger's fourth head coaching position in
his eighteen-year career. See Chad Konecky, High and Dry (June 20, 2000), available at
http'//espn.go.com/highschool/a/00062Odry.htmL Thirty-nine Division I women's basketball
programs also began the season under the direction of a new head coach. See NCAA Division
I Coaching Changes (Apr. 17, 2001), at http'//espn.go.com/ncw/s/coachestnew.html.
126. For example, applying the condition argument to the dispute in Fortay, the
agreement between Johnson and Fortay regarding Johnson's remaining the head coach at
Miami is arguably a condition to the contract. Fortay would not be under a duty to attend
Miami if Johnson left the school, as he did. Johnson's departure would discharge Fortay's
duty of attendance and allow Fortay to terminate the contract, including the NLI, between
himself and Miami. Fortay then could have attended a different university without losing
anyofhis eligibility. Fortayv. University ofiami, No. 93-3443,1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1865
(D.N.J. Feb. 17, 1994); supra note 106 (discussing Fortay).
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documents, a brief discussion of the parol evidence rule and its
applicability is necessary. 12
7
The parol evidence rule gives legal effect to the parties' intention
to make their writing a complete expression of the agreement they
reached, to the exclusion of all prior negotiations, oral or written. M
The rule excludes previous and contemporary agreements to a
writing when the writing is completely integrated,129 the parol term
contradicts express clauses,' the term is within the scope of the
writing,'3 1 or the term would not naturally be excluded from the
writing.3 2 Traditionally, the rule was rigidly applied; the modern
trend, however, has been to limit its application.'
Whether the writing is considered completely or partially
integrated depends on the intent of the parties. The parties must
have intended the writing to be a "complete and exclusive ex-
pression of all terms on which agreement was reached, as
distinguished from merely a final expression of the terms it
contains" for it to be considered completely integrated.3 4 "A
document in the form of a written contract, signed by both parties
and apparently complete on its face, may be decisive of the issue in
the absence of credible contrary evidence."3 5 A writing cannot prove
its own completeness, however, and courts allow wide latitude for
inquiry into the intentions of the parties.3 6
Regardless of the court's determination, when an agreement is
either partially or completely integrated, it supercedes inconsistent
127. For a thorough discussion of the rule, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, §§ 7.1 to 7.17c.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, §
7.2.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(1) (1981) ("A completely integrated
agreement is an integrated agreement adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement." ).
130. Id. § 213(1) ("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the
extent that it is inconsistent with them.").
131. Id. § 213(2) ("Abinding completelyintegrated agreement discharges prioragreements
to the extent that they are within its scope.").
132. Id. § 213(3) ("[A]n integrated agreement, even though not binding, may be effective
to render inoperative a term which would have been part qfthe agreement if it had not been
integrated.").
133. FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 7.3.
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. (b) (1981).
136. Id.
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terms of previous agreements. 3 ' Paragraph 19 of the NLI expressly
acknowledges that the athlete is entering a contract with the
institution, and not with a particular sports team or coach.
138
An oral agreement between a coach and athlete that the coach
will remain at the institution in its current capacity is likely to be
judged contrary to the terms in Paragraph 19. It seems in-
comprehensible to reconcile an agreement between a coach and an
athlete based on the coach remaining in the position with a clause
in the NLI that disregards the identity of the coach. Under this
analysis, courts are unlikely to admit evidence of the oral
agreement that contradicts the writing.
Exception for Conditions
An exception to the parol evidence rule exists for parties to a
written agreement who orally agree that performance of the
agreement is subject to the occurrence of a stated condition.
Evidence is admissible to show an oral agreement that the written
agreement between the parties was not to take effect, in the sense
that no duty would arise until the condition occurred. 139 Under such
circumstances, the agreement is not integrated with respect to the
condition." If the parties orally agreed that performance of the
written agreement was shbject to a condition, either the writing is
not integrated or only partially integrated." Further, even the
presence of an integration clause that explicitly negates oral terms,
such as Paragraph 18 of the NLI,"2 does not control the admission
of such evidence, because effectiveness of the clause itself depends
on being part of a valid agreement.'
137. Id. § 215.
138. 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A.
139. FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 7.4.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217 cmt. (b) (1981).
141. I& For example, the New York Court of Appeals held that an oral agreement that a
merger not become effective unless "equity expansion funds" were first procured was a
condition precedent to consummation of the contemplated merger, and without such
additional capital, no contract existed. Hicks v. Bush, 180 N.E.2d 425 (N.Y. 1962).
142. Paragraph 18 states: "My signature on this NLI nullifies any agreements, oral or
otherwise, which would release me from the conditions stated within this NLI." 2000-2001
NLI, infra APP. A, 1 18.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217 cmt. (b) (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 48, § 7.4.
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Courts consistently have regarded the exception for conditions
precedent as necessary.14' Written loan guarantees, for example,
have been held invalid because conditions precedent to the
formation of the contract had not been met.145 The New York Court
of Appeals explicitly stated that in the banking industry, "it ha[s]
long been the rule that where the terms of the conditional delivery
have not been complied with, the instrument is unenforceable and
parol evidence is admissible to show that the delivery ... was a
conditional delivery.
" 146
Parol evidence is admissible to show the intent of the parties as
to whether the writing was intended to be integrated even where a
merger clause bars such evidence. It is presumed that a written
contract is "the final repository of the agreement of the parties" and
an integration clause strengthens the presumption." 7 Intent,
however, is a "question of fact, and to determine the intent of the
parties, it is necessary to look not only to the written instrument,
but to the circumstances surrounding its execution."'" The rule
that emerges from such holdings then, is that oral evidence is
admissible and necessary to determine accurately the scope of the
entirety of the contract.
An athlete, under the condition precedent exception to the parol
evidence rule, should be allowed to introduce an oral agreement
that conditions performance under the NLI. Courts are increasingly
unwilling to defeat the intentions of the parties to a contract and
are especially wary of standard form agreements, such as the
NLI."49 Despite the harsh application of the rule in past judicial
eras, the parol evidence rule should not stand as a challenge to
athletes who assert that unfulfilled conditions discharge their
contractual duties and allow for the NLI to be terminated.
144. See Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co., 125 F. 110, 115 (3d. Cir. 1903); Williams v. Johnson,
229 A.2d 163, 164 (D.C. 1967); Long Island Trust Co. v. International Inst. for Packaging
Educ., 344 N.E.2d 377, 379 (N.Y. 1976); Hicks, 180 N.E.2d at 425.
145. See Long Island Trust Co., 344 N.E.2d at 377.
146. Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
147. See Williams, 229 A.2d at 165.
148. Id.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 cmt. (d) (1981).
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Unconscionability
The Doctrine
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'5" questioned the majority's derogation of
traditional principles of fairness and equity.
ms there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly
embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic
doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as
instruments of inequity and injustice? Does any principal in our
law have more universal application than the doctrine that
courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative
positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably
taken advantage of the necessities of the other? ... The law is
not so primitive that it sanctions every injustice except brute
force and downright fraud. 5'
Later courts have echoed Justice Frankfurter's admonition:
[Iln present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract
has appeared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong
bargaining power and position. The weaker party ... is
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms,
either because the author of the standard contract has a
monopoly.., or because all competitors use the same clauses.'52
Justice Frankfurter's appeal for justice and equity has fallen on
deaf ears in the athlete-university context. Courts, when deciding
actions for breach of contract, routinely fail to acknowledge the
manifest disparity in position, power, and knowledge between
universities and athletes, harkening instead to institutional pleas
for leniency and adherence to the doctrine of academic abstention.'
150. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
151. Id. at 326.
152. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960) (internal
quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
153. Academic abstention refers to a doctrine under which courts defer decisions relating
to a university's proper use of discretion to the academic institutions themselves. The
doctrine does not automatically preclude courts from deciding issues that arise from the
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Such decisions do little to vindicate the rights of the oppressed
party in such relationships, instead perpetuating continued
injustice and subjugating the athlete to a situation that has been
"likened to a mild form of involuntary servitude."'54
Such disparity in the positions of the university and student, and
the maneuverability within the bounds of the NLI enjoyed by the
respective parties, indicates that an action asserting that the NLI,
or at minimum Paragraph 19, is unconscionable may meet judicial
acceptance. The doctrine is not limited by equity and invites courts
to "police" contracts for unfairness. 5' The problem most often faced
by courts when trying to apply the doctrine is an absence of a
definition in either the Restatement or the U.C.C.'56 Perhaps the
most durable definition was set forth by the court in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.: "Unconscionability has generally
been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party."'57 The doctrine then,
can be considered to encompass two distinct elements: (1) one party
lacks meaningful choice in relation to contract terms (resulting in
student-university relationship. Student claims against universities, usually breach of
contract claims alleging the universityfailed to educate the student, traditionallywere either
dismissed or narrowly construed because the claims are considered to be within the province
ofacademia. See Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1295-97; Educating Misguided StudentAthletes,
supra note 28, at 101-02. For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine, see Virginia Davis
Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University
Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 145-49 (1981-82); see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d
410, 415-17 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[C]ourts are not qualified to pass an opinion as to the
attainments of a student... and... courts will not review a decision of the school authorities
relating to academic qualifications of the students."); Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting,
582 N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("The quality of the education and qualifications
of the teachers employed ... are concerns not for the courts ....").
154. Koch, supra note 59, at 254.
155. FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 4.28.
156. Id.
157. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The "absence of meaningful choice" is commonly
referred to as "procedural" unconscionability, while "unreasonably favorable terms" is
referred to as substantive unconscionability. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 4.28. The
traditional definition of uconscionability is offered in more obtuse terms. "[A] bargain was
said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it was 'such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on
the other." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. (b) (1981) (quoting Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)).
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"take it or leave it" bargaining strategies), and (2) the terms
themselves are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
Bargaining power, however, is not the only consideration. 58 Most
cases of unconscionability involve both "unreasonably favorable
terms" and "lack of meaningful choice," and virtually all courts
require that some substantive unfairness result from upholding the
contract. 59 That a contract is one of adhesion therefore, is not
necessarily a fatal flaw, especially when there is no element of
surprise in the terms.
60
158. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1997) ("T'he principle is one ofthe prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power."); cf Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) ("We
think it is too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the plaintiffto relief
in a court of conscience.").
159. See, e.g., Communications Maint. v. Motorola, 761 F.2d 1202,1209-10 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding thatno substantive unconscionabilitywas present and therefore declining to address
issues ofproceduralunconscionability);cf AmyH. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and
Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 132, 139-40 (1995) (discussing necessity that
unfairness in bargaining process be present for unconscionability to occur).
A number of factors are considered by various courts in determining whether a contract
is unconscionable. These factors include:
(1) The use ofprinted form orboilerplate contracts drawn skillfullybythe party
in the strongest economic position, which establish industry wide standards
offered on a take it or leave it basis to the party in the weaker economic
position; (2) a significant cost-price disparity or excessive price; (3) a denial of
basic rights and remedies to a buyer of consumer goods; (4) the inclusion of
penalty clauses; (5) the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract, including its commercial setting, its purpose and actual effect; (6) the
hiding ofclauses which are disadvantageous to one party in a mass of fine print
trivia or in places which are inconspicuous to the party signing the contract; (7)
phrasing clauses in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that
divert his attention from the problems raised by them or the rights given up
through them; (8) an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed
by the bargain; (9) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated,
uneducated and the illiterate; and (10) inequality of bargaining or economic
power.
Willie v. Southwestern Bell Co., 549 P.2d 903,906-07 (Kan. 1976) (affirming the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to Southwestern Bell on a claim of breach of contract for
omitting a Yellow Pages advertisement; holding that a clause limiting the telephone
company's liability in the advertising contract was not unconscionable because it was not
against the public interest) (citations omitted).
160. See Weaverv. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144,148 (Ind. 1971) (holding that parties
may make contracts exculpating one of negligence, but the terms of such contracts must be
knowingly and willingly entered into). The Weaver dissent defines an adhesion contract as
"one that has been drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a take
it or leave it' basis to the weaker party, who has no real opportunity to bargain about its
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A party's "take or leave it" bargaining posture is subject to the
same analysis. Absent a lack of meaningful choice, use of such
tactics by a party to the contract will not cause a court to find the
contract unconscionable. 61 Ifthe items bargained for in the contract
could be procured elsewhere on different terms or are not essential
to the party claiming unconscionability, courts will generally uphold
the bargain.
62
If a contract or contract term is held to be "unconscionable at the
time the contract is made, a court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result." 61 Such
a rule overlaps with rules that render particular terms in bargains
unenforceable on public policy grounds, particularly in the case of
standardized agreements, and affords the sitting court discretion to
strike only unconscionable terms in an otherwise valid agree-
ment.' This practice allows the court to effectuate the parties'
intent upon entering the contract while considering the resulting
fairness to the parties.
Application to the NLI
An athlete must show both procedural and substantive
unconscionability for a court to hold the NLI, or one of its terms,
unconscionable. The athlete shoulders the burden of proving that
the institution held a gross advantage in bargaining power, the
athlete had no meaningful choice of parties with whom to contract,
and therefore, entered into a contract the terms of which were
terms." Id. at 153.
161. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1993).
162. Id. at 50. Kastely argues for commentators and courts to take notice of the social
positioning of parties to contracts and the effect such positions, particularly when great
disparity characterizes the relationship, have on the substance of the contract's terms. Once
such an understandingis reached, she argues, the use ofmultiple contract theories can move
lawyers and scholars beyond "the reductive dualism of consent and nonconsent" to
understand "each disparate piece of the ironic whole of contract." Kastely, supra note 159,
at 141-43, 182.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); accord U.C.C. § 2-302 (1981).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. (a), (e), (g) (1981).
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unreasonably favorable to the university at the time of its
making. 1
65
Procedural Unconscionability
The NLI is a standard form agreement, the provisions of which,
by definition, cannot be adjusted to encompass the intent of the
particular athlete and university. 6 This places the athlete in a
"take it or leave it" situation. The athlete is not afforded the
freedom to engage in a meaningful exchange with university
officials because of the virtually universal use of the NLI, and
NCAA regulations that prohibit altering the document or the
terms contained therein.167 Essentially, the collusive behavior of
universities who participate in the N-LIP prevents the athlete from
negotiating terms in his or her best interests.' NCAA rules impose
penalties on athletes who do not follow NLI provisions, and should
an athlete orally commit to an institution but not sign a NLI, there
is no guarantee that the institution will reserve a scholarship for
the athlete.'69 The collusive nature of the NLIP forces the athlete
into an unconscionable relationship, divesting the athlete of any
ability to negotiate more favorable terms.
Proponents of the NLI counter with a twofold argument. They
argue that the athlete, not the institution, has superior leverage in
165. See supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
166. See 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A, 1 15.
167. Id.; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 13.10.
168. See Craswell, supra note 161.
169. Hutton, supra note 41, at C6 ("The agreement may well be voluntary, but it's
necessary in the pressure-packed world of recruiting from a coach's perspective. If a recruit
doesn't sign a letter-of-intent, coaches will use the scholarship for another player who will
sign. The bottom line is that coaches want guaranteed commitments."). Certainly, there are
exceptions to this proposition. Louisiana State University star men's basketball player
Stromile Swift did not sign a NLI because he was worried about the future of the LSU
program and wanted to retain the ability to attend another institution. Former University
of California at Los Angeles star Ed O'Bannon's first choice was the University of Nevada
Las Vegas. O'Bannon did not sign a NLI because UNLV was mired in a NCAA investigation.
O'Bannon ended up at UCLA because he was uncomfortable with UNLV's predicament at
the time. Such exceptions are extremely rare however. Swift and O'Bannon were both rated
as two of the top recruits in the nation while in high school, and as such, could risk losing a
scholarship offer from a particular institution-an offer from some university would be
available. Telephone Interviewwith Karl Hicks, Associate Commis sioner ofthe Southeastern
Conference (Oct. 18,2000).
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the recruiting process because he or she can choose from a number
of interested universities.'70 This argument is flawed because
although the athlete may have many suitors, the agreement in
which he or she must enter to be guaranteed athletic financial aid
is the same, regardless of which suitor the athlete chooses.'V' The
argument fails to effectuate the terms "meaningful choice." Yes, the
athlete may be able to choose from a number of suitors, but if the
terms of the offered contract are the same, the choice between such
suitors is devoid of consequence. Wherever the athlete goes, he or
she is subject to the same terms.
The second counter-argument is that the athlete is free to orally
agree to attend and play for an institution without signing a NLI.
Such an argument ignores the reality of intercollegiate athletics.'
72
One only need look at the athletic teams fielded in"big time" college
athletics to recognize that the goal of the recruiting process is to
maximize the talent within the sports program by recruiting as
many quality players as possible. At any given time during a Duke
University men's basketball game, for example, numerous former
high school All-Americans and All-State players can be found
sitting on the bench, watching their teammates play. It is doubtful
that any university, with such a recruiting goal, would hold both a
scholarship and the corresponding financial aid available for an
athlete who does not sign the NLI. ' Recruiting is about certainty,
and without an athlete's signature on a NLI, a school cannot be
certain that the athlete will attend the institution. Faced with
such uncertainty, the university will almost invariably fill that
scholarship with an athlete who will sign the NLI, guaranteeing the
school a player. 7
4
170. Id.; see also, Woods, supra note 7, at 1C.
171. See NLI GUIDELINES, supra note 18 (noting that over 500 institutions currently
participate in the NLIP).
172. Tony Kornheiser, Freedom for Recruits: A Matter of Fairness, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
1989, at El ("Don't tell me that the [NLI] is voluntary, because if you're not ready to sign on
the appointed day, schools threaten to give your scholarship to someone else.").
173. Id.; Hutton, supra note 41, at C6.
174. See NLI GUIDELINES, supra note 18.
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Substantive Unconscionability
The athlete must also satisfy the substantive element of
unconscionability by showing that the NLI's terms were manifestly
unfair at the time of making the contract. By the time that the
athlete signs the NLI, the university officials already will have
represented to the athlete that the coach will remain with the
university in his or her present capacity. It is only after signing that
the athlete would discover that the coach is leaving, and
subsequently attempt to secure a full release from the contract's
obligations.
An argument that at the time the coach leaves that paragraphs
3, 4, 5, 15, 18, and 19 of the NLI are unconscionable is apparent.175
Under such circumstances, it is clear that the NLI fails to effectuate
the intent of both parties to the contract. Certainly, the institution's
intent is effectuated-the athlete is committed to attend the
university and participate in the athletic program. The athlete's
intent, however, is disregarded. Oral representations made by
university officials regarding the coach's continued role in the
program that the athlete considered a vital aspect of the bargain,
and often the sole motivation for attending the institution, are
expressly contradicted by the NLI. The NLrs language, therefore,
fully effectuates the university's intent, while disregarding the
athlete's intent to attend an institution and play for a particular
coach.
175. See 2000-2001 NLI, infra APP. A. "The terms of this NLI shall be satisfied ifI attend
the institution named in this document for at least one academic year." Id. I 3(a).
I understand that ifI do not attend the institution named within this document
for one full academic year, and I enroll in another institution participating in
the NLI program, I may not represent the latter institution in intercollegiate
athletics competition until I have completed two full academic years of
residence at the latter institution.... I shall be charged with the loss of two
seasons of intercollegiate athletics competition in all sports.
I& J[ 4. Paragraph 5 allows the athlete to enter into a QRA with the chosen institution, but
nonetheless provides that, "if I receive this qualified release, I shall not be eligible at a
second NLI institution during my first academic year of residence there, and I shall lose one
season of competition." Id. 1 5. "No additions or deletions may be made to this NLI or the
Qualified Release Agreement."Id. 115. "My signature on this NLI nullifies any agreements,
oral or otherwise, which would release me from the conditions stated within this NLI." Id.
18. "I understand that I have signed this NLI with the institution and not for a particular
sport or individual. For example, if the coach leaves the institution or the sports program,
I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI." Id. 1 19.
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The same argument, though perhaps more difficult to make, is
also applicable at the time the NLI was signed. The athlete did not
yet know of the coach's intent to vacate the position, but even so,
the NLI's terms severely restrict the athlete's rights while granting
the university rights and privileges, virtually carte blanche. The
athlete is prohibited from signing a professional sports contract,
17
leaving the chosen university without having attended for one full
year, 17 signing more than one NLI,178 falsifying any part of the
NLI, 179 adding or deleting terms to the NLI or QRA, 180 and most
importantly with respect to this Note, terminating the NLI before
matriculating at the chosen institution because a coach leaves
the institution or sports program.'81 Conversely, the institution
is prohibited from altering the terms of the NLI' 82 and having a
representative present when the athlete signs the NL. 8 ' The terms
of the agreement, prima facie, are unreasonably favorable to the
stronger party, the chosen university.
The substantive and procedural unconscionability of the NLI
gives courts two options. Courts may opt to invalidate the writing
as a whole, finding that the unconscionability infuses the entire
contract. A second option would be to invalidate only those clauses
that restrict the athlete's ability to terminate or alter the NLI when
the coach, a primary reason for the athlete's choice, moves to
greener pastures despite university oral representations that the
coach would remain.
CONCLUSION
Many athletes are drawn to schools where they will be able to
maximize their athletic talents under the tutelage of a particular
coach. The desire to study under a certain individual is no different
in athletics than in academia or the performing arts. An aspiring
176. Id. I 2(a).
177. Id. 3.
178. Id. 1 8.
179. Id. 1 12.
180. Id. 15.
181. Id. 1 19.
182. Id. 15.
183. Id. 1 20.
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musician may desire to study under a particular instructor to
further refine his or her musical talents. If the instructor were to
leave the institution before the student matriculated, that student
would be free to follow the teacher to another institution, risking
only the nominal deposit paid to reserve the student's place in the
entering class. Why should the same not be true for athletes? The
intent of the individual is the same in both situations, yet the
athlete, if he or she follows the instructor, must sacrifice two full
years of eligibility for a move that generally costs a nonathlete
student a nominal deposit and perhaps some scholarship money.
Fine arts majors who do not matriculate at their first chosen
institution do not face such unreasonable penalties.
The NLIP was originally developed to protect athletes from the
travesties and aggravation of an out-of-control recruiting process.
It has accomplished this purpose. The NCAA and CCA should be
commended for reducing the pressure placed on high school athletes
by college recruiters. The NLI, in some respects, acts as a shield for
the athlete. After signing, the athlete is protected from further
inquiries and interruptions by NCAA regulations."' For the most
part, the intrusions faced by recruited athletes cease.
The same document that isolates the signed athlete from
recruiting efforts, however, also unfairly restricts the athlete's
ability to pursue his or her dreams and ambitions. By failing to
recognize the importance of the coach in an athlete's decision to
attend a particular institution, the NLI falls far short of
effectuating the athlete's intent, while affording the chosen
institution the full benefit of its "bargain."
Courts consistently recognize that the athlete-university
relationship is built upon such a bargain, upholding actions brought
by athletes for breach of express promises. The NLI is a contract of
adhesion that, by its terms, restricts the athlete's ability to
negotiate and enter a true bargained-for agreement. Athletes are
faced with a take-it-or-leave it situation, and currently, their only
avenue for appeal is the CCA, a body directed by the same
184. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 13.1.
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university administrators that perpetuate use of the NLI. 8 5 Actions
for breach under the NLI, therefore, must be based upon oral
representations.
Courts, however, have failed to recognize actions that allege a
university's breach ofimplied contractual terms. University officials
thereby are given license to abandon athletes in a variety of ways,
including making changes in athletic department personnel that
directly contradict representations made to the athlete, without fear
of judicial reprisal. When such representations are made, athletes
must look to alternative causes of action, such as alleging an
unfulfilled condition or asserting that the NLI is unconscionable, to
vindicate their rights and effectuate their intentions when they
signed the NLI and bound themselves to the chosen university.
Alleging that the NLI is unconscionable or that certain express
conditions are unfulfilled may provide the "end run" that athletes
need to level the judicial playing field, and may supply relief from
their duties under the NLI when coaches vacate their positions
subsequent to the athlete's NLI signing. The representations
communicated to athletes in the course of the recruiting process
have yet to be considered implied promises that give rise to breach
actions, and recharacterization of the representations as conditions
may find greater judicial acceptance.
Attacking the NLI as unconscionable may meet judicial approval
because of the inherent disparity in position and bargaining power
assumed by universities and athletes. Universities "lock-up"
athletes who have little free choice in whether to accept the terms
of the NLI, based on representations by coaches and other athletic
department officials. Conversely, the same coaches and represented
institutions retain their professional mobility, seemingly without
obligation to the athletes. Such inequities deserve judicial
recognition.
Athletes trapped in undesirable situations through no fault of
their own should continue to assert actions for breach of contract
based on parol promises made by subsequently departed coaches.
185. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps courts will finally recognize the need for judicial activism
in this arena. Until such recognition is granted, however, the
doctrines ofunconscionability and failure of conditions to a contract
may assist in effectuating the intent of such athletes when they
entered into bargains with their chosen universities, and may afford
athletes the same opportunities granted to nonathletic scholarship
recipients.
Michael J. Riella
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APPENDIXA
TEXT OF THE 2001-2002 NLI
1. Initial Enrollment in Four-Year Institution. This NLI
is applicable only to prospective student-athletes who will be
entering four-year institutions for the first time as full-time
students, except for 4-2-4 transfers who are graduating from
junior college as outlined in paragraph 8-b. With the exception
of midyear transfer students in football, no prospective
student-athlete enrolling at midyear shall sign a NLI.
2. Financial Aid Requirement. I must receive in writing an
award including athletics financial aid for the entire 2001-
2002 academic year from the institution named in this
document at the time of my signing. A midyear football junior
college transfer must receive athletics financial aid for the
remainder of the 2000-2001 academic year. The award letter
shall list the terms and conditions of the award, including the
amount and duration of the financial aid. If such conditions
are not met, this NLI shall be declared null and void, and the
institution which submits such a letter for signature to a
prospect shall be in violation of the NLI Program and may be
subject to appropriate sanctions.
a. Professional Sports Contract. If I sign a
professional sports contract, I will remain bound by the
provisions of this NLI in all other sports, even if the
institution named in this document is prohibited from
making athletically-related financial aid available to me
in the sport in which I signed under NCAA rules.
3. Provisions of Letter Satisfied.
a. One-year Attendance Requirement Met. The
terms of this NLI shall be satisfied if I attend the
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institution named in this document for at least one
academic year.
b. Junior College Graduation. The terms of this NLI
shall be satisfied ifI graduate from junior college after
signing a NLI while in high school or during my first year
of full-time enrollment in junior college, provided it is not
the year I am scheduled to graduate from junior college.
4. Basic Penalty. I understand that if I do not attend the
institution named within this document for one full academic
year, and I enroll in another institution participating in the NLI
program, I may not represent the latter institution in
intercollegiate athletics competition until I have completed two
full academic years of residence at the latter institution.
Further, I understand that I shall be charged with the loss of
two seasons of intercollegiate athletics competition in all sports,
except as otherwise provided in this NLI. This is in addition to
any eligibility expended at the institution at which I initially
enrolled.
a. Early Signing Period Penalties. A prospective
student-athlete who signs a NLI during the early signing
period (November 8-15, 1999) will be ineligible for
practice and competition in football for a two-year period
and also shall be charged with the loss of two seasons of
competition in the sport of football.
5. Qualified Release Agreement. A qualified release
agreement shall be provided in the event the institution and I
mutually agree to release each other from any obligations to the
NLI. I understand that if I receive this qualified release, I shall
not be eligible for competition at a second NLI institution during
my first academic year of residence there, and I shall lose one
season of competition. This Qualified Release Agreement form
must be signed by me, my parent or legal guardian, and the
Director of Athletics of the institution named in this document,
and I must file a copy of the Qualified Release Agreement with
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the conference which processes this NLI. (A Qualified Release
Agreement may be obtained from the institution named in this
document.)
a. Authority to Release. A coach is not authorized to
void, cancel or give a release to this NLI.
b. Extent of the Qualified Release Agreement. The
provisions of the Qualified Release Agreement shall
apply to all participating institutions and shall not be
conditional or selective by institution.
6. Appeal Process. I understand that the NLI Steering
Committee has been authorized to issue interpretations, settle
disputes and consider petitions for a full release from the
provisions of this NLI where there are extenuating
circumstances. I further understand that its decision may be
appealed to the NLI Appeals Committee, whose decision shall be
final and binding.
7. Letter Becomes Null and Void. This NLI shall be declared
null and void if any of the following occurs:
a. Admissions Requirement. This NLI shall be
declared null and void, if the institution with which I
signed notifies me in writing that I have been denied
admission or by the opening day of classes, has failed to
provide me with written notice of admission, provided I
have submitted a complete admission application.
1. It is presumed that I am eligible for admission
and financial aid until information is submitted to
the contrary. Thus, it is mandatory for me, upon
request, to provide a transcript of my previous
academic record and an application for admission
to the institution named in this document.
2. If I am eligible for admission, but the
institution named in this document defers
admission to a subsequent term, this NLI shall be
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rendered null and void. However, if I defer my
admission, the NLI remains binding.
b. Eligibility Requirements. This NLI shall be
declared null and void if, by the openingday of classes in
the fall of 2001, I have not met (a) the institution's
requirements for admissions, (b) its academic
requirements for financial aid to athletes, OR (c) the
NCAA requirement for freshman financial aid (NCAA
Bylaw 14.3) or the junior college transfer rule.
1. If I become a nonqualifier (per NCAA Bylaw
14.3), this NI shall be rendered null and void.
2. If I am a midyear junior college football transfer
signee, the NLI remains binding for the following
fall term if I was eligible for admission and
financial aid and met the junior college transfer
requirements for competition for the winter or
spring term, but chose to delay my admission.
c. One-Year Absence. This NLI shall be null and void if
I have not attended any institution (or attended an
institution, including a junior college, that does not
participate in the NLI Program) for at least one academic
year after signing this NLI, provided my request for
athletics financial aid for a subsequent fall term is not
approved by the institution with which I signed. To
receive this waiver, I must file with the appropriate
conference commissioner a statement from the Director
of Athletics at the institution named in this document
that such financial aid will not be available to me for the
requested fall term.
d. Service in the U.S. Armed Forces. Church Mission.
This NLI shall be null and void if I serve on active duty
with the armed forces of the United States or an official
church mission for at least eighteen (18) months.
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e. Discontinued Sport. This NLI shall be null and void
if my sport is discontinued by the institution named in
the document.
f. Recruiting Rules Violation. If the institution (or a
representative of its athletics interests) named in this
document violated NCAA or conference rules while
recruiting me, as found through the NCAA or conference
enforcement process or acknowledged by the institution,
this NLI shall be declared null and void. Such declaration
shall not take place until all appeals to the NCAA or
conference for restoration of eligibility have been
concluded.
8. Only One Valid NLI Permitted. I understand that I may
sign only one valid NLI, except as listed below.
a. Subsequent Signing Year. If this NLI is rendered
null and void under Item 7, 1 remain free to enroll in any
institution of my choice where I am admissible and shall
be permitted to sign another NLI in a subsequent signing
year.
b. Junior College Exception. If I signed a NLI while in
high school or during my first year of full-time
enrollment in junior college, I may sign another NLI in
the signing year in which I am scheduled to graduate
from junior college. If I graduate, the second NLI shall be
binding on me; otherwise, the original NLI I signed shall
remain valid.
9. Recruiting Ban After Signing. I understand that all
participating conferences and institutions are obligated to
respect my signing and shall cease to recruit me upon my
signing this NLI. I shall notify any recruiter who contacts me
that I have signed. Once I enroll in the institution with which I
signed, the provisions of NCAA bylaw 13.1.1.3 shall govern.
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10. Institutional Signatures Required Prior to
Submission. This NLI must be signed and dated by the
Director of Athletics or his/her authorized representative before
submission to me and my parents (or legal guardian) for our
signatures. This NLI may be mailed prior to the initial signing
date. When a NLI is issued prior to the initial signing date, the
"date of issuance" shall be the initial signing date and not the
date that the NLI was signed or mailed by the institution.
11. Parent/Guardian Signature Required. My parent or
legal guardian is required to sign this NLI ifI am less than 21
years of age at the time of my signing, regardless of my marital
status. If I do not have a living parent or a legal guardian, this
NLI may be signed by the person who is acting in the capacity of
a guardian. An explanation of the circumstances shall
accompany this NLI.
12. Falsification of NLI. If I falsify any part of this NLI, or if
I have knowledge that my parent or guardian falsified any part
of this NLI, I understand that I shall forfeit the first two years
of my eligibility at any NLI participating institution as outlined
in Item 4.
13. 14-Day Signing Deadline. If my parent or legal guardian
and I fail to sign this NLI within 14 days of issuance to me, it
will be invalid. In that event, another NLI may be issued within
the appropriate signing period. (NOTE: This does not apply to
the early signing period).
14. Institutional Filing Deadline. This NLI must be filed
with the appropriate conference by the institution named in this
document within 21 days after the date of final signature or it
will be invalid. In that event, another NLI may be issued.
15. No Additions or Deletions Allowed to NLI. No additions
or deletions may be made to this NLI or the Qualified Release
Agreement.
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16. Official Time for Validity. This NLI shall be considered
to be officially signed on the final date of signature by myself or
my parent (or guardian). If no time of day is listed, then 11:59
p.m. is presumed.
17. Statute of Limitations. This NLI shall carry a four-year
statute of limitations.
18. Nullification of Other Agreements. My signature on this
NLI nullifies any agreements, oral or otherwise, which would
release me from the conditions stated within this NLI.
19. If Coach Leaves. I understand that I have signed this NLI
with the institution and not for a particular sport or individual.
For example, if the coach leaves the institution or the sports
program, I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI.
20. Coaching Contact Prohibited at Time of Signing. A
coach or an institutional representative may not hand-deliver
this NLI off campus or be present off campus at the time I sign
it. This NLI may be delivered by express mail, courier service,
regular mail or facsimile machine. An NLI transmitted to an
institution by facsimile machine shall be considered valid.
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APPENDIX B
NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT PROGRAM
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT
As a participating institution in the National Letter of Intent
Program, we agree to adhere to all regulations outlined in the
National Letter of Intent. Specifically, we understand that the
basic purpose of the NLI is to limit recruiting pressure on
prospective student-athletes and to reduce recruiting time and
expense.
With this understanding, our coaches agree to fully explain the
NLI to each prospective student athlete during the recruiting
process and to specifically inform all prospects of the penalties
associated with not fulfilling the NLI. We agree that providing
this information to a prospect prior to his/her signing an NLI will
alleviate many future misunderstandings.
In addition, we fully understand that we are obligated to adhere
to the recruiting ban provision of the NLI, which includes the
prohibition of institutional staff members from telephoning
prospects who have signed a valid NLI. We are required to
respect a student-athlete's signing with another institution and
shall cease to recruit any student-athlete who has signed with
another institution. Finally, we understand that the NLI
Steering Committee has the authority to enforce the recruiting
ban provision of the NLI.
Institution:
Signature - Director of Athletics:
Date:
PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN TO YOUR CONFERENCE
OFFICE.
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APPENDIX C
QUALIFIED RELEASE AGREEMENT
signed a
National Letter of Intent certifying his/her
decision to enroll at for the
academic year.
It has been mutually agreed by the student-athlete, his/her
parents or legal guardian, and the Director of Athletics of the
above named institution that the student receiving this properly
executed Qualified Release Agreement shall not be eligible for
competition at the second NLI member institution during the
first academic year of residence and shall be charged with the
loss of one season of competition.
REDUCTION OF BASIC PENALTY: The student-athlete,
his/her parent or legal guardian, and the Director of Athletics
release each other from any commitment or liability to each
other as the result of the National Letter of Intent. All parties
state that they have read this Qualified Release Agreement,
fully understand its meaning and effect, know it is an
unconditional release in full as to each other, and that they have
voluntarily signed it. This Release shall be effective
immediately.
SIGNED
Student-Athlete Director of Athletics
Student-Athlete's Social Security Number
Parent or Legal Guardian
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Student-Athlete's Permanent Street Address
City, State, Zip Code
Date Signed Date Signed
This form must be completed in triplicate. One copy should be
retained by the student-athlete, one copy by the institution, and
one copy sent to the conference which processed the original
national letter of intent.
National Letter of Intent
2201 Richard Arrington, Jr. Blvd. N.
Birmingham, Alabama 35203-1103
Phone: (205) 458-3000
Fax: (205) 458-3031
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